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The doctrine of preemption developed in response to the conflicts
produced by concurrent state and federal assertions of regulatory
jurisdiction. Traditional preemption analysis has emphasized an
inquiry into the intent of Congress to occupy an area exclusively.
The author, however, expresses the view that the search for con-
gressional intent has led courts away from consideration of intent
to preempt as expressed by federal administrative agencies themselves.
He therefore constructs a two-level intent model, which recognizes
both statutory and administrative intent as factors in preemption.
The author proceeds to apply this model to resolve some of the more
perplexing preemption questions arising from simultaneous federal
and state regulation of CATV.
I. INTRODUCTION
A DRAMATIC escalation of both the number and sophistica-tion of cable television facilities has led several states and
numerous municipalities to initiate regulation of CATV operations.'
This regulation may be divided into two categories: franchising
and operational regulation. Encouraged by the tremendous poten-
tial for both community service and monetary reward, local corn-
* B.A., Wesleyan University, 1971; J.D., Harvard University, 1974.
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1. See Rivkin, The Changing Signals of Cable TV, 60 GEO. L.J. 1475,
1481-84 (1972). Manifestations of state attempts to regulate CATV include:
ALASKA STAT. § 42.05.701(2)(B) (1962); CAL. PUB. Uni. CODE §§ 215.5,
768.5 (West Supp. 1974); CoNN. GEN. STAT. REV. §§ 16-330 to -333 (Supp.
1974); HAwAII REV. STAT. § 269.1 (Supp. 1973); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24,
§ 11-42-11 (Smith-Hurd 1974); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 166A, §§ 1-20
(Supp. 1974); NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 711.010-.180 (1971); N.Y. ExEC. LAw,
art. 28 §§ 811-31 (McKinney Supp. 1974); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §§ 39-19-1
to -19-8 (Supp. 1973); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, §§ 501-08 (Supp. 1974).
CATV (Community Antenna Television), for the purposes of this article,
denotes the reception by a television set of signals via a coaxial cable rather
than over the air. Although it may be contended that the term CATV is no
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munities began early in the development of CATV -to assume an
active role in the franchising of CATV systems. Until quite re-
cently, however, there has been very little interest on the part of
most states in entering the field of CATV franchising, despite strong
arguments in favor of the assumption by state authorities of this
franchising role.2 More typically on the state level, it is operational
regulation of CATV that has begun to appear.3 Although it stems
from legitimate state concern over the direction of the growth of the
CATV industry, such regulation becomes the source of considerable
consternation when it overlaps with the emerging scheme of federal
regulation in the CATV field.
When, in 1971, it issued its Third Report and Order on Commun-
ity Antenna Television Systems 4 and subsequently promulgated a set
of regulations5 in accordance with that Report, the Federal Commun-
ications Commission (FCC) set forth an extensive system of regula-
tion of many aspects of the cable television industry. One funda-
mental issue raised by this development is the extent to which these
regulations preempt state efforts to regulate CATV. That is, may
the states now legitimately regulate cable television at all? If so, to
what extent does the existence of federal regulation effectively limit
the scope of state regulation? This article is directed to the resolu-
tion of these questions.
Critical to the analysis of preemption of state CATV regulations
is the initial recognition that there are two modes of federal action
that may displace state power in a given area. Federal action in this
regard may be manifested either by statute alone or through the
workings of a statutorily created administrative agency. Any pre-
emption of state authority by FCC regulations is clearly of the latter
type. However, while the body of law outlining various tests for
preemption solely by federal statute is both substantial and well-
longer appropriate, since the local "community" is not exclusively serviced, that
generally accepted term will be used throughout this article. For an introduc-
tion into the technology of CATV, see SLOAN COMMISSION CABLE CoMMUNI-
CATIONS, ON THE CABLE: THE TELEVISION OF ABUNDANCE 11-22 (1971).
2. Local franchise agreements have largely failed to reach broad issues
such as programming and technical standards. See Rivkin, supra note 1, at
1482-83. Furthermore, although some municipalities have entered franchise
agreements that purport to control rates, channel use, or technical standards,
these attempts have generally not been upheld by the courts, and many CATV
companies are able to evade regulation altogether. See Note, Regulation of
Community Antenna Television, 70 CoLum. L. REV. 837, 850-51 (1970).
3. See note 1 supra:
4. 32 F.C.C.2d 13 (1971).
5. 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.1-.617 (1973).
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reasoned,0 judicial examination of administrative preemption suffers
from a basic analytical confusion. The root cause of this confusion
seems to be that the courts, when faced with questions of potential
preemption -by federal administrative regulation, have borrowed
heavily in their analyses from cases dealing with preemption by
federal statutes alone.7 Such parallelism, however, proves to be
wholly inappropriate as a 'basis for analysis of administrative pre-
emption.
H1. A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
To determine the true preemptive effect of FCC action upon
state regulation of CATV, a basic model for preemption in the
context of administrative action, -generally, must be constructed.
Such a model must then be applied to the realm of CATV. As
background, however, it is necessary to outline the basic statutory
preemption analysis.
A. Preemption by Self-Executing Statutes
Over the years, courts have had little difficulty in discovering
the existence of preemption by statutes where -the state regulation
in question directly conflicted with the explicit terms of a "self-exe-
cuting"s federal statute.9  The most common question arising in
cases of self-executing statutes is whether an actual conflict exists
between the regulation attempted by the state and the federal poli-
cies embodied in the federal statute. This question generally re-
quires reviewing courts to construe 'both the statutes and regulations
involved, searching above all for the intention of Congress. As
long as the intended federal regulation is within the reach of con-
gressional power-an assumption to 'be made throughout this dis-
6. See notes 8-31 infra and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., San Diego Unions v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959), dis-
cussed in text accompanying notes 81-83 infra, in which the court searched
desperately for a congressional intent within the Taft-Hartley Act as if it were
dealing with a self-executing statute.
8. The term "self-executing statute" is used throughout this article to
mean a statute that requires no administrative action to become effective. That
is, a self-executing statute does not contemplate administrative regulations or
depend for execution on policy decisions by an administrative agency.
9. All preemption discussions must begin with the constitutional basis for
the doctrine: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of
the Land .... " U.S. CONST. art. VI.
[Vol. 25:258
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cussion-a clear intention on the part of Congress will suffice to
preempt conflicting state action. As a corollary, when congressional
intent is not clear, and it is possible to construe the federal action as
not creating a conflict between the statutes, courts -have often refused
to find an intent to preempt state regulation. Thus, in Huron Ce-
ment Co. v. Detroit,'0 Justice Stewart restated a previous formula-
tion of the preemption test:
In determining whether state regulation has been pre-
empted by federal action, "the intent to supersede the ex-
ercise 'by the State of its police power as to matters not cov-
ered by -the Federal legislation is not to be inferred from
the mere fact that Congress has seen fit to circumscribe
its regulation and to occupy a limited field. In other
words, such intent is not to be implied unless the act of
Congress fairly interpreted is in actual conflict with the law
of the State."'"
Courts faced with state regulation that purports to parallel or
complement a system of federal legislation have had more difficulty
in deciding whether preemption has occurred. One of the fields of
greatest judicial activity on this subject, especially in recent years,
has been patent and copyright law. Although the patent area is
complicated by the constitutional prescription of congressional au-
thority,12 the lines of analysis pursued by the Supreme Court are
applicable to most cases of -parallel state regulation.
The major statement of the Court on patent preemption has ap-
peared in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.,' 3 where the Court
struck down an attempt by Illinois unfair competition laws to provide
protection to inventors that went beyond that offered by the federal
patent laws. Speaking for the majority, Justice Black stated: "Just
as a State cannot encroach upon the federal patent laws directly, it
cannot, under some other law, such as that forbidding unfair com-
petition, give protection of a kind that clashes with the objectives of
the federal patent laws.' 4 Justice Black's reference here was to the
purpose, or intention, of Congress in designing the federal patent
laws; even though not explicitly in actual conflict with the federal
10. 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
11. Id. at 443.
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
13. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
14. Id. at 231. In Stiffel, Illinois attempted to protect the inventor of a
popular pole-lamp which had been declared unpatentable under federal law.
Even though no finding of patent infringement was possible, the Illinois court
was willing to find unfair competition in the exact duplication of the Stiffel
design by Sears, Roebuck & Co.
19751
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statutes, a state regulation will be preempted if it appears to con-
tradict the intent the Court attributes to the Congress. A compan-
ion case to Stiffel, Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite,15 re-emphasized this
aspect of -the -preemption doctrine, pointing out that a state might
find various ways of protecting inventors and the public without con-
tradicting the intent of Congress. The Stif el rationale was again
applied in Lear, Inc. v. Adkins'6 to bar state court enforcement of
private agreements to guarantee royalties on unpatented devices.1
In the copyright area, the Supreme Court, in Goldstein v. Cal-
ifornia,1s purported to distinguish the Stiffel line of decisions on the
ground that failure to legislate in a particular area demonstrated a
lack of congressional intent to "draw a balance" between competing
objectives, which could 'have excluded state regulation.' 9 Chief Jus-
tice Burger, speaking for the majority, concluded that:
In regard to mechanical configurations, Congress had bal-
anced the need to encourage innovation and originality of
invention against ,the need to insure competition in the sale
of identical or substantially identical products. The stand-
ards established for granting federal patent protection to
machines thus indicated not only which articles in this par-
ticular category Congress wished to protect, but which con-
figurations it wished to remain free. The application of
15. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
16. 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
17. See Note, The "Copying-Misappropriation" Distinction: A False Step
in the Development of the Sears-Compco Pre-Emption Doctrine, 71 COLuM.
L. REV. 1444 (1971). While agreeing that "the primary responsibility for de-
ciding whether a state should be permitted to act within a sphere of congres-
sional competence should therefore be left to Congress," id. at 1449, the Note
goes on to propose a balancing test, comparing the impact of state action on
the achievement of federal policy objectives with the importance of the state
policy embodied in the state statute. This balancing test, however, seems to
rest on the uncertainty of Congress' intent in areas not specifically covered by
existing patent and copyright legislation; that is, in those areas where congres-
sional intent could not be directly determined from the face of the statute, or
even from a clear expression in the legislative history. The Note suggests that
a court considering expansion of the Stiffel doctrine proceed by weighing the
effect of such an extension on state powers. If Congress feels that this balance
does not fairly reflect its policy, it is, of course, free to address the subject
specifically.
18. 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
19. Goldstein reviewed a California statute making it a criminal offense
to "pirate" sound recordings produced by others. Although the petitioners
sought to apply the Stiffel doctrine, the Supreme Court, over a strong dissent
from Justice Douglas, seemed to treat copyright cases differently from patent
cases. It should be noted that federal copyright protection had been extended
to sound recordings in 1972.
[Vol. 25:258
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state law in these cases to prevent the copying of articles
which did not meet the requirements for federal protection
disturbed the careful balance which Congress had drawn
and thereby necessarily gave way under the Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution. No comparable conflict be-
tween state law and federal law arises in the case of re-
cordings of musical performances. In regard to this cate-
gory of "Writings," Congress has drawn no balance; rather,
it has left the area unattended, and no reason exists why
the State should not be free to act.20
Outside the patent field, preemption doctrines for self-executing
statutes have developed around the central theme of discovering
the intent of Congress. In this vein Justice Butler spoke for the
Court in Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Porter:21
Its [Congress'] power to regulate such commerce and all
of its instrumentalities is supreme; and, as that power has
been exerted, state laws have no application. They cannot
be applied in coincidence with, as complementary to or as
in opposition to, federal enactments which disclose the in-
tention of Congress to enter a field of regulation that is
within its jurisdiction. 22
This formulation, however, ignores the crucial question of precisely
what Congress did intend; to say that Congress intended "to enter
a field of regulation" is merely to say that it did legislate some form
of regulation in that field. An intention to preempt, 'however, must
rest on congressional intent to regulate exclusively-to occupy to-
tally-the field in question. Thus, a blanket rule that even com-
plementary state regulation is automatically preempted is probably
over-restrictive of state action.
Twenty-two years after Porter, the Supreme Court applied such
a purposive test in California v. Zook.23  Specifically rejecting the
assertion that "coincidence is as ineffective as opposition," 24 Justice
Murphy focused the issue of intent on "whether Congress intended
to make its jurisdiction exclusive. ' 25 Faced with a silent statute and
an absence of relevant legislative history, the Court noted that "we
know that normally congressional purpose to displace local laws must
20. 412 U.S. at 569. On the other hand, it could be argued that Goldstein
implies a limitation of the Stiffel line to the patent field, reducing its useful-
ness in other situations of federal preemption.
21. 273 U.S. 341 (1927).
22. Id. at 346.
23. 336 U.S. 725 (1949).
24. Id. at 729.
25. Id. at 731.
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be clearly manifested. '2 6 The Zook Court took this concept of in-
tent to its logical extreme. As evidence of a lack of congressional
intention to oust state authority, the court noted that there had been
no existing state laws to displace at the time of passage of the statute
in question.2 7 Under the Zook formulation intent is an active con-
cept not to be inferred except on strong evidence of a congressional
purpose inconsistent with complementary state regulation.
The most complete and therefore most authoritative statement to
date of the tests to be applied to complementary or parallel state
.regulation in the face of a self-executing congressional statute is found
in Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul.U8 In that case, the
Supreme Court was asked to decide whether a California statute could
constitutionally exclude from California markets avocados that had
been certified to be marketable by a federal marketing order issued
pursuant to congressional statute.
Justice Brennan, speaking for the majority, noted "[t]hat the
California statute and the federal marketing orders embody different
maturity tests is clear. However, this difference poses, rather than
disposes of the problem before us."'29 Looking first to its substance,
he asked whether the state regulation actually obstructed the objec-
tives that motivated the congressional action and found that "there
is neither such actual conflict between the two schemes of regulation
that both cannot stand in the same area, nor evidence of a congres-
sional design to preempt the field."30  Thus the Court promulgated
a two-pronged test for preemption by self-executing statutes: Either
a "natural conflict" between the subject matters of the state and
federal regulations must exist, or Congress must have clearly and
unmistakably evinced its intention to bar state regulation, inconsistent
or not.31
It is clear that in the field of self-executing federal statutes pre-
emption of state regulation is grounded on the statute itself. If the
subject matter of the federal statute inherently contradicts the state
law, as determined by statutory construction, then the supremacy
26. Id. at 733. Zook sustained a California law penalizing interstate car-
riers operating without an ICC permit. The dissent called this holding novel
in that it allowed a state to impose an additional punishment for a federal of-
fense without congressional authorization.
27. 336 U.S. at 735.
28. 373 U.S. 132 (1962).
29. Id. at 141.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 146.
EVol. 25:258
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clause clearly invalidates the state action. If, however, there is no
such conflict, then the intention of Congress to bar further state
regulation must either explicitly appear in the statute or be deduc-
ible from that statute in order to effect preemption.
When the statute is ambiguous with respect to the intent of Con-
gress in a specific area, 32 then it is proper to look to the competing
federal and state interests involved, as the Supreme Court did in
Stiffel and its progeny. Thus, even though a powerful state interest
will not defeat preemption in the face of a clear statement of con-
gressional intent, or a blatant contradiction of the federal statutory
purpose, such an interest might have a useful role in balancing the
competing federal considerations when some ambiguity as to con-
gressional intention is present. This central concept of intent is
clearly relevant in resolving questions of preemption by a self-exe-
cuting federal statute. Where, if not to the statute and its legisla-
tive history, could a court turn for guidance in such cases?
B. Preemption by Administrative Action
Contrary to the easy assumptions of some courts, however, the
congressional intent test of Florida Avocado Growers in not neces-
sarily a useful or meaningful concept when applied to the actions
of a federal administrative agency. A fundamental reason for the
failure of this analogy is that there are several ways in which an ad-
ministrative agency might react to a grant of power from the Con-
gress. If it determines to respond actively to a given problem, the
federal agency can actually devise and implement a regulatory
scheme for the area in question, or it can attempt to preempt the
area without active regulation. Should an agency decide not to exer-
cise its authority, it may opt simply to ignore the subject area-non-
regulation-or may act to renounce or decline its jurisdiction, per-
haps in the hope that a state or another agency will assume respon-
sibility for the area.
When, and insofar as, an agency determines actively and ac-
tually to regulate an area of commerce placed within its jurisdiction
by Congress, the courts have found no difficulty in applying the
supremacy clause, just as in the case of a self-executing statute. In
32. Such ambiguity might result because the statute in question did not
fully contemplate the problems that might eventually arise in that field. This
situation was present in TV Pix v. Taylor, 304 F. Supp. 459 (D. Nev. 1968),
where the fact that the expansion of cable television had not been predicted by
Congress affected the court's treatment of preemption. See notes 70-80 infra
and accompanying text.
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such a situation the only real question becomes whether the agency
does, in fact, have power over the area and if so, whether it is ac-
tively and legitimately exercising it.33 If these tests are met, the
agency's regulation is normally seen by courts as an extension of the
Congress' will and power. This is the essence of the "delegation
of power" question, which raged over administrative agencies in their
early years and which has been largely settled in favor of legitimiz-
ing agency regulation.34 According to the standard argument in such
cases of active regulation, the Congress' intent is to allow such regu-
lation. The agency is merely carrying out Congress' intent. Con-
trary state regulation would contravene the expressed intent of Con-
gress that the agency have power over the field. Consequently, the
question of preemption of state regulation is determined according
to the same rules applied to conflicts with self-executing statutes.35
This approach has been used by the Supreme Court to decide a
preemption case involving the FCC. In Radio Station WOW, Inc.
v. Johnson,36 a fraternal benefit society leased its radio station to a
corporation formed to operate the station. After application to the
FCC for consent to transfer the license, but before FCC approval
had been obtained, the society sued in state court to set aside the
lease for fraud under a state law. The FCC subsequently approved
the transaction and the transfer was made. The Commission, more-
over, conceded a lack of jurisdiction over the state issue of fraud.
The Supreme Court of Nebraska, however, set aside the lease and
license,3 7 prompting defendants to protest that Nebraska was pre-
empted from jurisdiction by the FCC. On certiorari, the Supreme
Court affirmed, 'holding that:
. . . if the State's power over fraud can be effectively re-
spected while at the same time reasonable opportunity is
afforded for the protection of that public interest which led
to the granting of a license, the principle of fair accommo-
dation between State and federal authority, where the
powers of the two intersect, should be observed.38
33. In TV Pix v. Taylor, 304 F. Supp. 459 (D. Nev. 1968), it was stated
in dictum that active FCC regulation of a field within its jurisdiction would
definitely preempt state regulation.
34. See Davis, A New Approach to Delegation, 36 U. Cm. L. Rav. 713
(1969). But cf. National Cable Television Ass'n Inc. v. United States, 94 S.
Ct. 1,146 (1974), in which Justice Douglas seems to resurrect the delegation
of power issue.
35. See generally L. JAFFE, JUDIciAL CONTROL OF ADMISTRATnE AcTMON
(1965).
36. 326 U.S. 120 (1945).
37. 144 Neb. 406, 13 N.W.2d 556 (1944).
38. 326 U.S. at 132.
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This "principle of fair accommodation" is nothing more than an at-
tempt to interpret agency action in the same way a court might con-
strue statutory language and to avoid finding a conflict that would
preempt state action unless such a conflict is inherent in the char-
acter of the federal action.39
On the other hand, when a federal administrative agency has no
immediate plans for the exercise of its regulatory mandate, its re-
sponse has commonly been nonregulation, unaccompanied by any ex-
pression of intent either to preempt or to permit state regulation.
One occasion for such nonregulation has been during that period
between the grant of power to the agency and the final creation of a
regulatory program by the agency. This "interval" concept has
frequently been utilized by courts faced with preemption issues. 40
One early case that struggled with the nonregulation question
was Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co.41 in which Justice
Brandeis confronted the issue whether the Boiler Inspection Act, del-
egating power over interstate locomotive equipment to the Interstate
Commerce Commission, precluded state requirement of safety equip-
ment that was not required by the ICC. Even though the Court
found that the ICC 'had made no other requirement inconsistent
with the state legislation,"'42 it believed that fact to be without legal
significance. 43 Following classic preemption doctrine, Justice Bran-
deis recited -that the only relevant inquiry was "the construction of
the Act delegating the power." 44
The purpose of the statutory construction in Napier was to as-
certain the intent of Congress. Thus Brandeis continued, "We hold
that state legislation is precluded, because -the Boiler Inspection Act,
as we construe it, was intended to occupy the field. The broad
scope of the authority conferred upon the Commission leads us to
that conclusion. '' 46 Since Congress had not explicitly expressed an
39. A second type of active agency response to a grant of regulatory
power, preemption without regulation, is far from being a common phenome-
non. In fact, the assertion of authority to so respond by the FCC in the area
of leased access cable television channels is of sufficient novelty to create seri-
ous theoretical problems. Since there do not appear to be any decided cases
on point, the resolution of these problems must await the creation of a model
capable of application to preemption without regulation, and will consequently
be considered at length later in this article.
40. See text accompanying notes 54-56 infra.
41. 272 U.S. 605 (1926).
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intent to preclude state regulation, the Court might have interested
itself in ,the possible intent of the ICC to leave the area unregulated
or, in -fact, to allow state regulation until it should decide to enter
the -field. Nevertheless, ,the presumed intent of Congress was re-
garded as controlling notwithstanding that ,the execution of that in-
tent had been delegated to an administrative agency.
Considerably later, in Garner v. Teamsters Local 776,46 in the
radically different context of the detailed Labor Management Re-
lations Act,47 the Supreme Court was still concerned with discover-
ing in an unclear statute signs of Congress' intentions to permit or
prevent state regulation. Justice Jackson framed the problem as 'he
saw it: "The National Labor Management Relations Act, as we
have before pointed out, leaves much to the states, though Congress
has refrained from telling -us 'how much. We must spell out from
conflicting indications of congressional will the area in which state
action is still permissible."48
In the area of preemption questions involving state regulation
that possibly conflicts with federal administrative agencies, the la-
bor area has been the most thoroughly fought-over battlefield in re-
cent decades. 49 One of the most explicit and therefore most import-
ant decisions in this field is Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State
Labor Relations Board.50 There, the National Labor Relations
Board failed to exercise jurisdiction over foremen's bargaining units
despite a Supreme Court determination that it possessed such a
power. Meanwhile, the state labor relations board attempted to es-
tablish its own jurisdiction so that the area might not be left wholly
unregulated. Justice Jackson noted that "Congress 'has not seen fit
to lay down even the most general of guides to construction of the
Act, as it sometimes does, by saying that its regulation either shall
or shall not exclude state action." 51 In other words, any appeal to
46. 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
47. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141 et seq. (1970).
48. 346 U.S. at 488.
49. Frequent amendments and modifications of the controlling statute, the
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1970), have made a re-
ality of the concept of congressional will in many specific areas; at the same
time, however, the volume of labor preemption cases has tended to develop is-
sues with their own momenta and points of dispute. Thus, while no modem
discussion of preemption by administrative action could ignore the labor field,
care must be taken in attempting to draw legal conclusions that retain their
vitality when transferred to other fields.
50. 330 U.S. 767 (1947).
51. Id. at 771.
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the intent of Congress would be largely synthetic-that is, what can
be inferred about Congress' intent? Or, more appropriately, what
might Congress have intended had it considered the issue?
In the Napier case, the Court found a grant of "general power"
to the ICC over the subject matter in question and held such a grant
sufficient to oust state jurisdiction. However, approaching the same
situation with greater sophistication in Bethlehem, the Court noted
that:
When Congress has outlined its policy in rather general
and inclusive terms and delegated determination of -their
specific application to an administrative tribunal, the mere
fact of delegation of power to deal with the general matter,
without agency action, might preclude any state action if
it is clear that Congress has intended no regulation except
its own.5
2
The effect of this language is to create a qualification restricting
cases of automatic preemption to instances in which Congress has
clearly indicated its intention to preserve exclusive federal regulatory
jurisdiction. As a result, only a finding by a reviewing court that
Congress intended to exclude all other regulation in the field will
lead to a holding of automatic preemption. 3
The Bethlehem Court -went on to discuss the "interval" situation,
where "Congress has passed statutes which, initiate regulation of
certain activities, but where effective regulation must wait upon the
issuance of .rules 'by an administrative body."54 In such a situation,
"this Court -has usually held that the police power of the state may
be exercised." 55 A similar result will obtain, said the Court, "if the
measure in question relates to what may be considered a separable or
distinct segment of the matter covered by the federal statute and the
federal agency has not acted on that segment. ... "56
In contrast, the Court suggested that "the conclusion 'must
be otherwise where failure of the federal officials affirmatively to
exercise their full authority -takes on the character of a ruling that
no such [federal] regulation is appropriate or approved pursuant to
52. Id. at 773 (emphasis added),
53. In such a case, however, the intent of the agency is clearly of little
importance. Thus, the Bethlehem Court surveys various situations in which
congressional intent may or may not be inferred. 330 U.S. at 773-74. Cf.
Note, Overlapping Federal and State Regulation of Labor Relations, 15 U. Cm.
L. R v. 362 (1948).
54. 330 U.S. at 773.
55. Id. at 774.
56. Id.
1975]-
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the policy of the statute." 57 This passage, however, sounds a good
deal more illuminating than it is. The question remains, how are
courts-or litigants-to distinguish between a declination to act that
carries the force of a "ruling" that no state regulation is appropriate,
and one -that frees state action in a separable or distinct segment of
the matter? In this regard it is useful to note the comments of Pro-
fessor Powell on the significance of congressional failure to act:
Now congress has a wonderful power that only judges and
lawyers know about. Congress has a power to keep silent.
Congress can regulate interstate commerce just by not do-
ing anything about it. Of course when congress keeps si-
lent, it takes an expert to know what it means. But the
judges are experts. They say that congress by keeping si-
lent sometimes means that it is keeping silent and some-
times means that it is speaking. If congress keeps silent
about the interstate commerce that is not national in char-
acter and that may just as well be regulated by the states,
then congress is silently silent, and the states may regulate.
But if congress keeps silent about -the kind of commerce
that is national in character and ought to be regulated only
by congress, then congress is silently vocal and says that
the commerce must be free from state regulation.
These two constitutional speakings have been reported
from time to time by different justices and sometimes by
the same justice in the same opinion.58
The message, of course, is that congressional silence frequently says
nothing at all about congressional intentions to preempt or not to
preempt state regulation. Something more is often required by the
courts.
In Bethlehem the Court cites the absence of any "administrative
concession ' 59 -by the NLRB that ,the matter was beyond its authority
and notes that "[n]either did the National Board ever deny its own
jurisdiction over petitions because they were by foremen." 60  In
essence, the Bethlehem Court is groping for a "second stage" of in-
dicia to apply when the intent of Congress is clearly unascertainable.
What the Court finds, through the failure of the NLRB to take certain
actions, is a kind of "negative intent" on the part of the agency. Al-
57. Id.
58. Powell, Business Taxes and Interstate Commerce, 1937 PRocEEDNos
OF NAT'L TAX Ass'N 337, 338-39, an excerpt from which appears as The Still
Small Voice of The Commerce Clause, in 3 SELECTED EssAYs ON CONSTrru-
TIONAL LAw 931, 932 (1938).
59. 330 U.S. 767, 775 (1947).
60. Id.
[Vol. 25:258
PREEMPTION OF CATV REGULATION
most as an afterthought, Justice Jackson mentions that the NLRB
"asserts, and rightfully so .. .its power to decide whether these
foremen may constitute themselves a bargaining unit.""' While this
factor is not given decisive weight by the Court, it carries within it
the germ of a potential solution to the problem of preemption by ad-
ministrative agencies: ascertaining the intent of the federal agency.
Preemption questions have previously arisen in the context of the
operations of the Federal Communications Commission outside the
realm of CATV regulation. The most prominent of these opinions
is Head v. New Mexico Board of Examiners in Optometry,62 in
which the Supreme Court considered whether the Federal Communi-
cations Act had ousted normal state jurisdiction over the regulation
of advertising content in radio or newspaper communications. The
majority opinion, by Justice Stewart, recognized the state's interest
in the "protection of the public health" through such regulation, and
further noted that "this case in no way involves the Commission's
jurisdiction over technical matters such as frequency allocation, over
which federal control is clearly exclusive."6 3
There seemed little question, however, that the FCC had the
"authority to promulgate general regulations concerning the subject
of advertising for the guidance of broadcasters."'6 4 The question
was, once more, whether the existence of this unexercised power
preempted state regulation. Faced with a lack of conclusive evi-
dence on the question of congressional intent,65 the Court nonethe-
less concluded that:
The nature of the regulatory power given to the federal
agency convinces us that Congress could not have intended
its grant of authority to supplant all -the detailed state reg-
ulation of professional advertising practices, particularly
when the grant of power -to the Commission was accom-
61. Id. at 776.
62. 374 U.S. 424 (1963).
63. Id. at 430 n.6.
64. Id. at 431.
65. The first question the Court posed was whether Congress intended the
FCC exclusively to occupy the field in question. The Court answered in the
negative, saying, "Statements concerning the 'exclusive jurisdiction' of Congress
beg the only controversial question: whether Congress intended to make its
jurisdiction exclusive." 374 U.S. at 430, citing California v. Zook, 336 U.S.
725, 731 (1949). Indeed, the concurring opinion of Justice Brennan offers
persuasive historical evidence that Congress did not specifically intend the
FCC to regulate such matters and in fact granted the FCC no useful sanctions
for policing minor infractions until 1960. 374 U.S. at 433-37.
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panied by no substantive standard other than the "public
interest, convenience, and necessity." 66
Another factor that influenced the majority in Head was the absence
of any indication that the FCC had any intention of regulating such
advertising practices. 67 The Court, however, contented itself with
noting the lack of "any conflict between this state law and the federal
regulatory system," 68 and upheld the validity of the New Mexico
statute.69
Finally, in TV Pix, Inc. v. Taylor,70 a three-judge panel was
asked to analyze precisely the question of possible preemption of the
CATV area by the FCC. TV Pix is probably not determinative of
this question today 'because the nature of the FCC's asserted author-
ity over cable television has changed radically since 1968, the year
when TV Pix was decided; however, the opinion by Judge Thomp-
66. 374 U.S. at 431.
67. The second question in the Court's analysis was whether the state reg-
ulation conflicted with any existing FCC regulation: in other words, has the
FCC positively expressed an intent to preempt the field? Again the Court
found no conflict with federal regulations. This approach, however, raises the
critical problem of predictability in the absence of FCC regulation. Two prin-
cipal guidelines, of course, are congressional intent and circumscription of valid
fields for state control, both discussed previously. Addressing the effect of
FCC intent on preemption, the Court, relying on Florida Lime & Avocado
Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963), noted: "In areas of the law
not inherently requiring national uniformity, our decisions are clear in re-
quiring that state statutes, otherwise valid, must be upheld unless there is
found 'such actual conflict between the two schemes of regulation that
both cannot stand in the same area . . . .' 374 U.S. at 430. Justice
Brennan's concurring opinion offers evidence that the FCC specifically did
not intend to regulate the field in question. Id. at 441. The test applied
by the majority seems to require that in order to preempt state regulation, FCC
intent must be expressed by actual regulation.
68. Id. at 432. Justice Brennan, in concurrence, did recognize that the test
of "congressional intent exclusively to occupy the field, is apposite but the req-
uisite evidence is lacking." Id. at 443. He, too, professed to find a "congres-
sional design to leave standing various forms of state regulation," id., but fi-
nally rested his agreement with the finding of the majority on the absence of
"conflict either in purpose or in operation between the state and federal regula-
tions involved." Id. at 445. Having recognized at the outset that his quest
for "congressional intent" was futile, Justice Brennan seems, like the majority,
to have reached an intuitive judgment without clearly articulating the basis for
his finding.
69. The Head approach to preemption considers both congressional intent
and agency intent, as expressed positively by regulation in determining the
scope of state power. While the state may not regulate areas of the law "re-
quiring national uniformity," 374 U.S. at 430, it may regulate areas of more
local concern provided that it is not preempted there by expressions of congres-
sional or FCC intent.
70. 304 F. Supp. 459 (D. Nev. 1968), affd mem., 396 U.S. 556 (1970).
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son is worthy of note as much for the originality of its mode of an-
alysis as for its affirmance by the Supreme Court.
Initially, it is important to recognize that there was no question
that the cable operations being discussed in TV Pix were fully in-
terstate in nature, and of the type determined to be within the FCC's
jurisdiction by the Supreme Court in United States v. Southwestern
Cable Co. 71 The question before the TV Pix court was whether,.
despite their limited authority over cable television recognized by
Southwestern, the states retained the authority to franchise and regu-
late certain local incidents of cable television operations as they then
existed.72
The opinion first treated the issue whether state regulation itself
constituted a burden on interstate commerce, and was thus, without
more, unconstitutional. Not surprisingly, the court found that the
regulation did not burden interstate commerce, concluding that
"[w]e do not view the subjects of regulation contemplated by the
Nevada statute . . . as being of the character demanding national
uniformity." 73
The court subsequently addressed the preemption question di-
rectly, beginning with a quotation from Head to the effect that case-
by-case judgments must be made in determining preemption under
the Federal Communications Act."4 The relevant considerations in
answering the -preemption question were then set forth: "(1)
whether the breadth of the Congressional delegation of legislative
power to the federal agency encompassed power to regulate all as-
pects of the community antenna business, and (2) whether it in-
cluded a delegation of the power to preempt or not to preempt, within
the discretion of the agency." 75
In view of the traditional character of the first consideration, it
is the second criterion that draws attention.7  Nevertheless, the
Court backed away from developing the potentialities of the latter
by concluding that "we view the Federal Communications Act as
71. 392 U.S. 157 (1968); see notes 98-100 infra and accompanying text.
72. The local incidents that the Nevada statute sought to reach included
a requirement of "just and reasonable rates" for service and a demand for
"safe and adequate service, equipment and facilities." Nevada Community An-
tenna Television System Law, NEv. Rnv. STAT. § 711.150 (1971).
73. 304 F. Supp. at 463.
74. Id. at 464.
75. Id. at 465.
76. If, as the courts have so often announced, the sole and determinative
factor in preemption questions is the will of Congress, what is the source of
the agency's "discretion" to preempt or not to preempt?
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the kind of legislation where Congress has delegated to the executive
agency not only the power to regulate in a certain .broad area of
national interest but the power of supersession as well." 77 This would
seem to contract the meaning of the "discretion to preempt" con-
cept. It is hardly surprising that a valid regulation promulgated by
the FCC would supersede contrary, or even complementary state
regulation, under established preemption doctrines. Such an inter-
pretation -is strengthened by the following passage: "Thus, whether
preemption has in fact occurred, invalidating the Nevada Commun-
ity Antenna Television System Law under the Supremacy Clause of
the Constitution, depends on whether the Federal Communications
Commission has, in fact, regulated in this area and not upon whether
it has the power to do so."78 This makes the judgment an all-or-
nothing proposition: if no FCC regulation, then no preemption; if
FCC regulation, then preemption. It does not, however, answer the
crucial question of what for preemption purposes constitutes "regu-
lation."
Having pronounced this incomplete test, the TV Pix court trans-
cended it. Noting the restricted efforts at cable television regula-
tion made by the FCC up to that time the court quoted from an
FCC Notice of Proposed Rule Making:
Third, in the event that it is ultimately determined
that the Commission has jurisdiction over all CATV sys-
tems, we do not contemplate regulation of such matters
as CATV rates to subscribers, the extent of the service to
be provided, or the award of CATV franchises. Apart
from the areas in which the Commission has specifically in-
dicated concern and until such time as regulatory mea-
sures are proposed, no Federal preemption is intended.79
In other words, while not declining jurisdiction over these areas,
the FCC intended no preemption of state regulation; this clearly
cannot be derived directly from the statute. The TV Pix court,
though, declined to regard this statement as an agency construction
of its enabling statute, preferring to "view these pronouncements of
the FCC only as irrefutable evidence of the absence of present in-
tent to regulate and preempt state authority in the field of CATV
franchises, rates and service."' 0 By tying "regulate and preempt"
together, the court appeared to maintain fidelity to its test which
77. 304 F. Supp. at 465.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 466 n.4, citing Notice of Inquiry and Notice of Proposed Rule
Making, April 22, 1965, 1 F.C.C.2d 453, 466, at 32 (1965).
80. 304 F. Supp. at 466.
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found preemption only in actual regulation. Having granted im-
portance to the intent of the FCC, however, how would the TV Pix
court have dealt with an FCC intent to preempt that was not ac-
companied by actual regulation?
The Supreme Court suggested an answer to this question in San
Diego Unions v. Garmon.8 1 In that case, the National Labor Re-
lations Board had declined to rule on a labor conflict that fell clearly
within its congressional grant of authority.8 2 The California Su-
preme Court then held that in the face of the NLRB's refusal of ju-
risdiction, the California state courts gained jurisdiction over the
controversy, from which they would normally be preempted. The
Supreme Court reversed on the grounds that the regulated area was
clearly within the congressional grant of authority to the NLRB, and
that the NLRB had not clearly expressed an intent to cede juris-
diction to the state.8 3
Thus, a two-stage intent model is suggested for determining pre-
emption questions in regard to administrative agencies. At the first
81. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
82. The failure to rule apparently resulted because the amount of interstate
commerce involved did not meet the Board's monetary requirements. Id. at
238.
83. The Court stated that "the failure of the Board to define the legal sig-
nificance under the Act of a particular activity does not give the states the
power to act. In the absence of the Board's clear determination that an activ-
ity is neither protected nor prohibited or of compelling precedent applied to
essentially undisputed facts, it is not for this Court to decide whether such ac-
tivities are subject to state jurisdiction." Id. at 246.
Therefore, had the NLRB clearly expressed its intention not to assume ju-
risdiction, California would not have been preempted from operating in a field
that had been granted to the NLRB by an act of Congress. The Court is pri-
marily concerned here with avoiding potential conflict between state and fed-
eral regulation and not with rigidly maintaining the boundaries of NLRB juris-
diction.
It is important to note that the facts in this case put it on the fringe of
NLRB jurisdiction, outside of the normal area of NLRB regulation as defined
by its monetary cut-off point. It is questionable whether the Court would al-
low the NLRB to cede an issue of national importance to state jurisdiction.
With issues of merely local impact, however, the NLRB has only to clarify
its position by some positive action in order to cede jurisdiction to the states.
Cf. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958), which
considers the effect of congressional regulation on issues of great local im-
portance.
Such expressions of NLRB intent might have to be determined on a case-
by-case basis, unless the NLRB was willing to cede an area of local importance
to state authority permanently. Although the Court does not expressly con-
sider this point, it can be inferred from the Court's stress on the importance
of maintaining a clear distinction between areas of state and federal regulation.
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stage the question is whether Congress intended to grant broad and
flexible powers to the agency over the general area of regulation at
issue. If so, then the second question is posed: has the agency
demonstrated, clearly and unambiguously, its own intent to preempt
the field, either by regulating or by declaring its intention that pre-
emption should occur? By recognizing the need for this second
stage, courts can avoid the artificial and confusing attempts to dis-
cern the intent of Congress where no clear intent exists. 84
Under this model, once authority is delegated to an administra-
tive agency, it is the intent of the agency, and not that of Congress,
,that is relevant to preemption as long as the agency does not exceed
its legal authority. The model recognizes that unless agencies have
the ability -to establish the parameters of their regulation in both neg-
ative and positive terms, to prevent interference with their policies as
well as to promote those policies, their ability to execute effectively
the scheme of regulation that they deem to be appropriate will be
severely limited. Thus, agencies should be understood to have the
ability to exclude state regulation of some specific area of commerce
without acting affirmatively to -affect such commerce. The proposed
model closely resembles a syllogism: if an agency has legitimate
power over an area of commerce; and if it has expressed -an intent
to exclude state regulation of that area; then state regulation should
be deemed to be preempted, whether the agency has actually regu-
lated or not. Since it is the expression of agency intent latent in
actual regulation that is frequently and correctly regarded as signifi-
cant by courts, that intent is equally useful when presented explicitly,
removing any need to derive it from the content of regulation.
Recognition that agency intent to preempt is controlling, in the
absence of explicit statements in the enabling statute, does not place
regulated industries at the unbridled mercy of the agency. By ad-
mitting that within their jurisdictions agencies have the power to de-
termine the scope of their preemptive effect, judicial review does not
abdicate either procedural or substantive protections otherwise avail-
able. State regulatory power is not really diminished. Not only will
84. This model assumes, of necessity, that the actual regulation decided
upon by the agency not only is within the scope of its mandate from Congress,
but also is consistent with basic constitutional limitations, as well as other con-
gressional legislation. The determination of the validity of a particular agency
action must be made through construction of the statute that underlies the
agency's authority. What the two-stage intent model is meant to accomplish
is not the determination of regulatory validity, but rather the preemptive effect
of valid agency regulation,
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an agency expression of intent not to preempt 5 free the state to regu-
late where a more unguided court might find "occupation of the
field" by Congress, but also an agency expression of intent to pre-
empt can exclude state action only within the sphere legitimately
subject to federal agency regulation.
Thus, the model follows the interests in "fair accommodation '8 6
between state and federal authority previously seen as vital by the
Supreme Court; it will tend to prevent findings of preemption in the
absence of agency regulation, unless the agency itself opposes state
regulation. Furthermore, few federal agencies have shown ten-
dencies toward overextension of their powers; conservatism and in-
sufficient innovation-which may themselves help account for the
lack of a clear formulation of the problem of preemption by admin-
istrative action -to date-have been more common. Indeed, in
view of the frequently limited manpower, energy, and other resources
of federal agencies, a presumption might develop that a positive ex-
pression of intent to preempt without regulation is necessary to bar
state action. In any event, congressional action is available to cor-
rect results that exceed, or deplete, Congress' conception of the
agency's power and reach.8 7
The ultimate lesson, though, as the TV Pix decision illustrates,
is that courts have often looked, at least covertly, to agency intent
when faced with an absence of congressional expression. By ob-
Iscuring that operation behind the screen of a purported search for
the intent of Congress, however, courts have made their actions less
comprehensible and hence less predictable for both agencies and
regulated industries. Nowhere is that uncertainty more apparent
than in the cable television industry today. With this background
in mind, the remainder of this article will attempt to apply the "two-
stage intent" test to the cable television industry and to the FCC's
regulation of that industry. 8
85. See discussion of TV Pix, notes 70-80 supra and accompanying text.
86. See text accompanying note 38 supra.
87. For example, the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-
Hartley Act), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141 et seq. (1970), was amended by the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 519 (codified
in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.), in order to direct the NLRB to assert
jurisdiction over all disputes that met the amended Act's standards. Previously
the NLRB had been arbitrarily declining jurisdiction in cases that it felt were
insubstantial, and the amendment was designed to eliminate this discretion.
See 1959 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 595, 2318.
88. Before proceeding, it is worth examining a fourth kind of preemption
problem of a rather special nature and attempting to apply the two-level intent
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III. STATE REGULATION OF CABLE TELEVISION
A. The "Intent of Congress"
There ,has been no direct expression of congressional intent re-
garding cable television. The Federal Communications Act8 9 which
governs the communications field, became law in 1934, long before
cable television came into existence, and later amendments to that
statute have omitted any mention of cable television, although Con-
gress has debated giving the Federal Communications Commission
model to its solution. In this situation an administrative agency actively at-
tempts to renounce or decline its jurisdiction over an area of commerce where
it has been specifically empowered to act. The only major case in this area
is Guss v. Utah Labor Board, 353 U.S. 1 (1956). A somewhat unusual case,
Guss sought to determine whether the grant of jurisdiction to the NLRB by
Congress "has completely displaced state power to deal with such matters
where the Board has declined or obviously would decline to exercise its juris-
diction but has not ceded jurisdiction pursuant to the proviso to § 10(a) of
the National Labor Relations Act." Here, atypically, there existed a specific
provision in the Act providing a mechanism whereby the NLRB could cede
jurisdiction to a state agency over certain aspects of labor relations under cer-
tain conditions. Despite an apparent willingness on the part of the NLRB to
allow some of its jurisdiction to remain totally unexercised, the Court through
Chief Justice Warren purported to find an intent of Congress not to allow state
regulation. In his words, here "we find not only a general intent to pre-empt
the field but also the proviso to § 10(a), with its inescapable implication of
exclusiveness." 353 U.S. at 10.
The question becomes, does the Guss decision conform to the two-level in-
tent model proposed herein? Here, in contrast with most agency preemption
situations, there was an explicit prescription by Congress for cession of juris-
diction by the NLRB. Normal canons of statutory construction easily allow
the Court's conclusion that these provisions were meant to be exclusive-a le-
gitimate expression of Congress' intent that the NLRB have the power to decline
authority only as set out in the statute. Having found such a determinative
expression of congressional intent, the Guss Court correctly declined to afford
the intent of the agency any role whatever in determining state preemption.
The second stage of intent-that of the agency-is obviously relevant only
where the Congress has not directly expressed itself on the particular question
involved.
If there had been no specific proviso to the National Labor Relations Act,
then the inquiry as to the agency's intent, under the two-level intent model,
would have become relevant. In such a situation, the agency's willingness to
allow state regulation would, in most cases, be determinative; its intent to ex-
clude state regulation, despite its own inaction, would be accorded equal weight.
Thus, under this model, any attempt by an administrative agency to decline
or renounce its jurisdiction over a particular area of commerce, accompanied
by some clear indication of an intent not to preempt state regulation, should
be accepted by the courts, in the absence of a specific contrary indication from
Congress.
89. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1970).
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explicit authority over the industry.90 Nonetheless, this general
statute has been construed by the courts to provide a basis for fed-
eral regulation of cable television.91
The Act, however, is of such breadth, conferring such nebulous
powers, that it requires considerable judicial construction. One ap-
proach to such problems of construction was suggested in Farmers
Education and Cooperative Union v. WDAY, Inc.92 In that case the
Supreme Court addressed the question of whether section 315 of the
Act granted radio and television stations federal immunity from lia-
'bility under state law for libelous statements broadcast under the fed-
eral "equal time" doctrine9s since the station owners had no direct
control over such broadcasts. Noting that Congress had failed to
grant such immunity specifically, Justice Black, speaking for the
Court, commented, "And more than balancing any adverse infer-
ences drawn from congressional failure to legislate an express im-
munity is the fact that the F.C.C.-the body entrusted with admin-
istering the provisions of the Act-has long interpreted Sec. 315 as
granting stations an immunity."94 Such a view of the FCC's powers
reflects the Court's willingness to defer to the agency in the construc-
tion of the terms of the Federal Communications Act, in the absence
of a clear expression of congressional intent.
The FCC has, in the past, made similar pronouncements about
its authority over cable television. During the 1950's and early
1960's the FCC appealed to Congress for guidance in dealing with
the new phenomenon of community antenna television. Originally,
the FCC expressed serious doubts as to its power over cable trans-
90. For a concise cataloging of congressional activity regarding CATV, see
Rivkin, The Changing Signals of Cable TV, 60 GEo. LJ. 1475, 1479 n.17
(1972).
91. When asked to pass on federal authority over cable television, courts
have focused on §§ 151 and 152(a) of the 1934 Federal Communications
Act. These provisions grant broad authority over broadcasting and other elec-
tronic communications media to the FCC, which is required by the Act to en-
deavor to "make available ... to all the people of the United States a rapid,
efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio communication service
." 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1970). The provisions of the Act are made ap-
plicable to "all interstate and foreign communication by wire or radio." Id.
§ 152(a).
92. 360 U.S. 525 (1959).
93. 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1970) provides in pertinent part, that "[i]f any li-
censee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candidate for any of-
fice to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal opportunities to all
other such candidates for that office in the use of such broadcasting station:
Provided, that such licensee shall have no power of censorship over the ma-
terial broadcast under the provisions of this section."
94. 360 U.S. 525, 532 (1959).
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missions in the absence of explicit legislation.9 5 Congress, however,
did not respond, 96 and the FCC, faced with continuing congressional
inaction, began to regulate the retransmission of broadcast signals
over cable.97  Such authority was validated in United States v.
Southwestern Cable Co.9s There the Supreme Court limited its de-
cision by holding that "the authority which we recognize today un-
der § 152(a) is restricted to that reasonably ancillary to the effec-
tive performance of the Commission's various responsibilities for the
regulation of television broadcasting." 9 9
Thus, the Southwestern decision purported to develop a test for
FCC jurisdiction over cable operations: whether the regulation in
question was "reasonably ancillary" to broadcast responsibilities.
From the standpoint of uncovering the intent of Congress as inferred
by the courts, this standard seems to represent the view that cable
television regulation is subsumed under Congress' intent that broad-
cast signals be comprehensively regulated by the FCC. The extent
to which this secondary intent applies is not clear, however, from
the Southwestern formulation. 10 0 It should be noted that Southwest-
ern, like the cases that followed, was concerned solely with the FCC's
power over cable television; none were preemption cases, and thus
none were directed towards uncovering the FCC's expressed intent.
The next major decision attempting to elucidate the nature of
the FCC's power over cable -television was that by Circuit Judge
(now Chief Justice) Burger in General Telephone Company of Cali-
fornia v. FCC.10  Although this case dealt with the rebroadcast of
over-the-air television signals, a question previously faced in South-
western, General Telephone attempted to challenge further the FCC's
95. See Inquiry Into the Impact of Community Antenna Systems, TV
Translators, TV "Satellite" Stations and TV "Repeaters" on the Orderly De-
velopment of Television Broadcasting, 26 F.C.C. 403 (1959).
96. See Rivkin, supra note 90, at 1479 n.17.
97. Second Report and Order, 2 F.C.C.2d 725 (1966).
98. 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
99. Id. at 178. A more detailed history of early cable television, and of
the meaning of the initial court decisions discussing the scope of the FCCs
power over cable, can be found in the comprehensive articles by Rivkin, supra
note 90, and by Barnett, State, Federal and Local Regulation of Cable Televi-
sion, 47 NOTRE DAMn LAw. 685 (1972).
100. This failure was pointed out recently. "The Court offered neither a
test for determining the Commission's responsibilities for broadcast television
nor a method for deciding whether regulations are 'reasonably ancillary' to
those responsibilities." Note, Cablecasting: A Myth or Reality-Authority of
the F.C.C. to Regulate Local Program Origination on Cable Television, 26
RtrrGEns L. Rlv. 804, 810-11 (1973).
101. 413 F.2d 390 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 888 (1969).
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jurisdiction. Seeking to have its cable activities classified as "com-
mon carriage" under Title II of the Act, General Telephone claimed
exemption from the FCC's authority under various provisions of
Title II designed to remove entirely intrastate telephone lines from
FCC control. In describing the powers that the Federal Communi-
cations Act granted to the FCC, the court stated that:
Our evaluation of the Commission's interpretation of
the scope of its jurisdiction must take into account the Act's
broad purposes and objectives. We cannot ignore specific
exemptions and limitations which narrow its regulatory
powers, but neither can we overlook that Congress sought
to establish a pervasive jurisdiction over broadcasting.
The Act must be construed in light of the needs for com-
prehensive regulation and the practical difficulties inhering
in state by state regulation of parts of an organic whole.102
This broad construction by the court of the FCC's powers over
broadcasting and over the interpretation of the FCC's own jurisdic-
tion is echoed throughout the General Telephone opinion. In hold-
ing that the FCC was acting within the intent of the Act in deter-
mining that intrastate lines were merely links in an interstate chain,
the court pointed out that "[ilts [the FCC's] interpretation of its
grant and its application are entitled, of course, to great deference.
The Petitioners have, 'by choice, inserted themselves as links in this
indivisible stream and have become -an integral part of interstate
broadcast transmission."'1 3 The court buttressed such deference to
the FCC with the observation that "[t]his is particularly appropri-
ate when the reviewing court preliminarily views the interpretation
as one directed at achieving the reasonably authorized purposes of
the legislation in question."'10 4
At the same time it denied General Telephone's claim of purely
intrastate activity, the court of appeals also refused to find -that ca-
ble retransmission entitled General Telephone to common carrier
status, which would have made available various intrastate exemp-
tions from FCC authority. Once more, the court appealed to the
purpose of the Act, and deferred to the conclusion of the adminis-
trative agency entrusted with carrying out that purpose.' 0 5
The most recent, and most expansive judicial statement on the
FCC's powers over cable television under the Federal Communica-
102. 413 F.2d at 398.
103. Id. at 401.
104. Id. at 403.
105. Id. at 402.
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tions Act is United States v. Midwest Video Corp.'0 6  Specifically,
Midwest Video was concerned only with the validity of the FCC's
broadcast origination rule requiring owners of cable systems that re-
ceive over-the-air signals to originate some programming over their
cable systems, if such systems exceed a specific size.10 7 In 1972
this requirement was incorporated into a broad scheme of regula-
tion of many nonbroadcast aspects of cable regulation, which were
not technically ,before the Court in Midwest Video.'0 8
It was thus within the limited context of a challenge to -the origin-
ation requirement that a plurality of the Court, in validating that
requirement as reasonably ancillary to the FCC's other responsibil-
ities for broadcasting, mandated a broad scope for interpretation of
FCC jurisdiction. Excerpting from the FCC's Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, the Court agreed that the Commission's "concern with
106. 406 U.S. 649 (1972). By the time Midwest Video was decided, the
FCC had determined to extend its regulation of cable into the nonbroadcast
aspects of the industry. Af least some of the activities sought to be regulated
involved signals sent to subscribers through the cable without ever having been
sent over the air.
Much of the legal analysis which follows depends upon the distinction be-
tween "rebroadcast" and "cablecast" television signals delivered to subscribers
over cable systems. Cable television began as "Community Antenna Televi-
sion," whose only function was to capture television broadcasts that had been
sent over the air and transmit them over the cable to subscribers who would
otherwise have difficulty receiving them clearly. Later, this same system was
used to import distant television signals not otherwise receivable in the cable
system's community. Both of these activities involved use of broadcast signals,
and thus were subsumed under the rationale of General Telephone, which held
them part of an indivisible chain of interstate commerce.
In recent years, however, it has become apparent that, having "wired" a
home television receiver as part of a cable system, the cable owner has the ca-
pacity of delivering programming and other services over the cable to the sub-
scriber without capturing television signals from over the air. This is the
meaning of the term "cablecasting." Such programming can originate in a stu-
dio owned and/or managed by the cable owner and may thus involve no ob-
vious use of interstate commerce. As will appear below, it is such cablecasting
that was held by the Supreme Court in Midwest Video to lie within the author-
ity of the FCC to regulate as "ancillary" to its broadcast responsibilities, at
least for as long as the cable system is used to receive over the air signals
as well. See text accompanying notes 106-123 infra. For one argument that
FCC authority might extend to cablecasting by a system with no over the air
reception, if that system was interconnected with other cable systems in a "net-
work," see text accompanying notes 111 & 112 infra.
107. 14 C.F.R. § 76.251 (1973).
108. Since Midwest acknowledged that it did not want to cablecast and
hence lacked standing to attack the new FCC rules regulating cablecasting vol-
untarily undertaken, the Supreme Court had no opportunity to consider the va-
lidity of those regulations. 406 U.S. at 657 n.14.
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CATV carriage of broadcast signals -is not just a matter of avoid-
ance of adverse effects, but extends also to requiring CATV affirma-
tively to further statutory policies."10 9 The Court further acknowl-
edged, this time quoting from Southwestern, that "the Commission
has reasonably concluded that regulatory authority over CATV is
imperative if it is to perform with appropriate effectiveness certain
of its other responsibilities." 110
In addition, though the parties to Midwest Video did not directly
challenge FCC jurisdiction over local, intrastate cablecasts, the
Court did deal with that question as raised by the State of Illinois as
amicus curiae. In a lengthy and broadly phrased footnote, the
Court held that "in any event, CATV operators have, by virtue of
their carriage of broadcast signals, necessarily subjected themselves to
the Commission's comprehensive jurisdiction."'11  In addition, re-
lying on arguments from Professor Barnett, the Court stated: "The
devotion of CATV systems to broadcast transmission-together with
the interdependence between that service and cablecasts, and the
necessity for unified regulation-plainly sufficies to bring cablecasts
within the Commission's § 2(a) jurisdiction.""12 Such a broad read-
ing of FCC authority over cablecasting would arguably also suffice
to validate the more comprehensive program of regulation that fol-
lowed the origination requirement.
Though the concurring opinion of Chief Justice Burger reflects
his hesitation in conceding the FCC's authority to require program
origination, the scope of jurisdiction over CATV that he attributes to
the FCC is nonetheless extensive. He states that "Congress could
not aniticipate the advent of CATV when it enacted the regulatory
scheme nearly 40 years ago. Yet that statutory scheme plainly an-
ticipated the need for comprehensive regulation as persuasive as the
reach of the instrumentalities of broadcasting." 3 Though he
stresses the need for a new expression of congressional intent regard-
ing cable television so that basic policies are "not left entirely -to the
Commission and the courts,"" 4 Chief Justice Burger concludes that
"until Congress acts, the Commission should be allowed wide lati-
tude . . .,.
109. Id. at 653.
110. Id. at 661.
111. Id. at 663 n.21.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 675.
114. Id. at 676.
115. Id.
19751
284 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
From an analytical point of view, perhaps the most telling of
Chief Justice Burger's remarks was his statement: "That I might take
a different position as -a member of the Commission gives me no
license -to do so here. Congress has created its instrumentality to
regulate 'broadcasting, has given it persuasive powers, and -he Com-
-mission has generations of experience and 'feel' for the problem."'1' 0
The point is, of course, that the Chief Justice, throughout his opinion,
appreciates the FCC's legitimate authority to regulate whatever
phase of CATV operations it deems in need of such regulation;
while he may feel that the origination requirement is economically
unsound or favors one mode of communication over another," 7 it
should not be struck down-if only because it is an expression of
FCC intent to exercise its power to regulate CATV." 8
Even the dissent, written by Justice Douglas, grants the FCC
broad powers over nonbroadcast cable operations. The only real
ground of disagreement is over the power of the Commission to re-
quire origination, not to regulate it once it has been voluntarily un-
dertaken. Thus, near the end of his dissent, Justice Douglas declares
that "[t]he fact that the Commission has authority to regulate orig-
ination of programs if CATV decides -to enter the field does not
mean that it can compel CATV to originate programs.""19 Although
the Supreme Court's decision was a close one, it should not be read
as limiting the extent -to which the Court has validated the FCC's
regulation of nonbroadcast cable television activities; such regulation
has now been held -to be within the powers Congress intended -to grant
to the FCC in the Federal Communications Act.
Indeed, that the Supreme Court decision in Midwest Video
should be read as an endorsement of the FCC's entire program of
116. Id.
117. These were among the arguments advanced in the court of appeals
opinion. United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 441 F.2d 13 (8th Cir. 1971).
118. One critique of the Midwest Video decision, Note, supra note 100, has
approached it as a "fleshing out" of the vague test laid out in Southwestern.
The Note states that "the opinion, in relating the 'reasonably ancillary' test
to the rule in question, stated that the validity of the Commission's action de-
pended on whether a specific cable regulation would further the achievement
of long-established regulatory goals in television broadcasting." Id. at 812
(footnote omitted). Since these goals are put forward in the Federal Com-
munications Act itself, it is entirely reasonable to regard any FCC regulation
that pursues such goals as expressing the will of Congress. In other words,
any FCC regulation of cable television that is upheld under the Southwestern-
Midwest Video standard should be treated as equivalent in preemptive force
to the intent of Congress.
119. 406 U.S. at 680.
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regulation of cable television was predicted by the one author cited
by the Court:
While the rules announced in the Letter of Intent are not
themselves involved in the Midwest Video case, they raise
essentially the same questions with respect to the FCC's
authority to regulate the local incidents of cable, and it
seems likely that the forthcoming decision will settle the
question of the Commission's power -to adopt the intended
rules. 12 0
Another author has viewed Midwest Video as "[removing] a major
barrier to the development by the FCC of a comprehensive cable
television regulation, opening the way for major growth in the in-
dustry." '2  The author also points out the extent to which Midwest
Video defines the FCC's "mandate under the Communications Act
of 1934. ' 122 By making FCC jurisdiction over nonbroadcast as-
pects of cable depend on their effects on broadcast television, he has
stated that "the Supreme Court has widened the 'reasonably ancil-
lary' test to its logical limits. The Court has breached the line of
legal cur political uncertainty that has restricted FCC action, so that
future efforts to curb the exercise of the FCC's expanded powers will
require deliberate legislative initiatives.' 28
What conclusions, then, should be drawn from these three de-
cisions as to the intent of Congress regarding preemption of state
regulation of cable television? Clearly, the deciding courts have not
found the sort of "pervasive control" in the Federal Communications
Act of 1934 that would absolutely oust all state regulation.' 24
Rather, the courts have envisioned agency flexibility as the goal of
Congress. The FCC is seen as having the power to regulate or not
regulate cable activities, as it chooses. Broad, flexible powers over
the subject area entrusted to the FCC are combined with the power
120. Barnett, supra note 99, at 718 (footnote omitted).
121. Rivkin, supra note 90, at 1485.
122. Id. at 1487.
123. Id. at 1500.
124. The most recent judicial statement regarding the parameters of federal
regulatory jurisdiction over CATV was by the Supreme Court in National Ca-
ble Television Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 94 S. Ct. 1146 (1974). In that case
the Court noted that "the power to regulate, though not in the form of granting
licenses, extends to the promulgation of regulations requiring the compulsory
origination of programs by CATV.. . . Mhese CATV's, however, are not
under the exclusive oversight of the Commission. Local governments and even
some states provide permits or franchises to CATVs, including right of way
for the cables used." Id. at 1148.
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to regulate its own jurisdiction within the limits of the power dele-
gated to it.
The two-level intent model proposed earlier therefore can be
applied to the FCC's regulation of cable television. That is, for
preemption purposes, an analysis of the intent of Congress is only of
academic importance; Congress has effectively been found to have
delegated both the regulation of the area and the definition of con-
gressional intent to the FCC. Thus, it is the intent of the agency that
will govern preemptive effects on state regulation, and it is that intent
that must be isolated and examined.
B. The "Intent of the Agency"
The history of FCC regulation of cable television is complex and
unusual.125  A brief review of FCC regulation is important to set
the stage for -the more recent expressions of FCC policy toward ca-
ble. In the period preceding 1965, confusion reigned in all juris-
dictions regarding the proper authority, if any, to assume regulatory
responsibility over the new community antenna television industry.
The FCC announced its own belief in its inability to deal with the
industry without some further Congressional mandate. 126 Congress,
however, remained silent.127
Finally, in 1965, the FCC began to assert regulatory authority
over cable TV and issued its First Report and Order on Rules re
Microwave-Served CATV' 28 which initiated some regulation over
microwave transmissions used as parts of a system of signal distri-
bution involving cable. In 1966, the Second Report and Order on
CATV' -2 extended this regulation to include cable operations that
did not use microwave transmissions. This regulation involved a
highly restrictive approach, which attempted to limit the ability of
cable systems to "import" distant television signals into communities
otherwise unable to receive them, and which was based on the Com-
mission's fears of damage to the broadcasting industry-especially
to UHF stations, 80 for which the FCC has shown special solici-
125. See Rivkin, Yupra note 90, at 1495-150 1.
126. See note 95 supra and accompanying text.
127. See Rivkin, supra note 90, at 1479 n.17.
128. 38 F.C.C. 683 (1965).
129. 2 F.C.C.2d 725 (1966).
130. For example, the Commission stated that "tihe new UHF stations
face a difficult road; we would expect, with the passage of time and thus the
build-up of all-channel sets and related endeavors that these new operations
would be successful. But if CATV, with 12- or 20-channel capacity can obtain
very substantial numbers of subscribers in these same markets . . . the UHF
stations might face a very difficult hurdle." Id. at 774.
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tude.' 3 ' Then, in 1972, in its Third Report and Order on Commun-
ity Antenna Television Systems, 132 the FCC lifted these restrictions
on the retransmission of broadcast signals to a large degree. At the
same time the Commission began to deal with the nonbroadcast as-
pects of cable, under an avowed purpose of promoting program orig-
ination over cable lines, beyond the simple rebroadcast of television
signals.13 3
There is no question that the FCC program of comprehensive
regulation of cable retransmission of television signals has preempted
any possible state regulation in this area.' 34  However, in the rela-
tively new field of nonbroadcast origination,' 3 5 the FCC has not
said that CATV is the type of industry that requires uniform regula-
tion and total preemption of state or local initiative.' 36 The 1972
Rules thus reflect no intent on the 'part of the FCC to occupy the en-
tire field of cable television-as evidenced both 'by the partial na-
ture of the regulation announced in the 1972 Rules and by the spe-
cific regulatory duties reserved for state and local authorities by
those rules.137
What, then, are the actual parameters of FCC regulation of non-
broadcast cable television activity? Regulation is certainly the best
expression of the FCC's intentions regarding preemption of state
regulation. Such intentions may be supplemented, however, by var-
ious other indicia of FCC intent.
The rules promulgated by the FCC for regulation of nonbroad-
cast channels' 38 consist of several distinct components.' 39  Before
131. See Fostering Expanded Use of UHF Television Channels-First Re-
port and Order, 41 F.C.C. 1038 (1962); Fostering Expanded Use of UHF
Television Channels-Second Report and Order, 41 F.C.C. 1041 (1963);
Fostering Expanded Use of UHF Television Channels-Third Report and
Order, 41 F.C.C. 1052 (1964), supplemented, 41 F.C.C. 1062 (1964), 41
F.C.C. 1069 (1964), 41 F.C.C. 1077 (1965).
132. 36 F.C.C.2d 143 (1972).
133. These 1972 Rules proposed by the FCC have been issued in final form
at 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.1-.617 (1973).
134. Barnett, supra note 99, at 685.
135. See note 106 supra.
136. Note, Cable Television in Illinois: The Problems of Concurrent Juris-
diction, 50 CHI.-KENT L. Rnv. 119, 124 (1973).
137. These positive reservations of regulatory authority to local agencies fo-
cus principally on the franchising process. See notes 179-81 infra and accom-
panying text.
138. A cable attached to a home television receiver normally has a multi-
channel capacity; that is, it is capable of carrying a number of separate chan-
nels to the receiver. Both broadcast signals that are retransmitted over the
cable and signals originated in a cable system's own studio and then sent di-
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the 1972 Rules were announced, the FCC had already taken some
halting steps in the direction of regulating nonbroadcast channels.
The most controversial of these was the "'broadcast origination" re-
quirement, 140 which produced the Midwest Video litigation.141  As
the Court noted in Midwest Video, the FCC had suspended the orig-
ination requirement pending final judgment on its validity.' 42  As
originally issued, this requirement would have compelled all cable
systems with more than 3,500 subscribers to transmit to their cus-
tomers at least some programming not consisting of rebroadcast tele-
vision signals. However, even after the Commission's power to
promulgate the requirement was upheld in Midwest Video, the orig-
ination requirement was left, and still remains, in a state of suspen-
sion.1 43
What, then, is the preemptive effect of a formally suspended
regulation, which had been validly promulgated by an administra-
tive agency? Specifically, during the period of suspension, can
states or local authorities take it upon themselves to require pro-
gram origination by cable systems?144 There are three possible in-
terpretations of the suspension for intent purposes: First, the agency
rectly over the cable are carried by a cable in the same way: both occupy
individual channels on the cable. Since broadcast channels have been preemp-
tively regulated by the FCC, see notes 132-34 supra and accompanying text,
discussion has focused on FCC regulation of nonbroadcast channels.
It should be noted that rebroadcast of television signals is, in many cable
systems, a highly profitable business, whereas "cablecasting" is a new and rela-
tively untried venture for cable owners. Many cable systems are operated by
personnel with relatively low levels of technical sophistication, who might well
prefer not to involve themselves in the complications of studio operation re-
quired by cablecasting. Thus, the question who will regulate cablecasting
and what they will require or expect of the cable owner is of particular interest
to the various segments of the cable industry.
139. See 47 C.F.R. § 76.251 (1973).
140. Id. § 76.201(a).
141. See text accompanying notes 106-10 supra.
142. 406 U.S. 649, 654 n.7 (1972),
143. See Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Teleprompter Corp., 476
F.2d 338, 348 n.13 (2d Cir. 1973).
144. An interesting question in this regard is whether states can require pro-
gram origination by some party other than the system owner. Even the sus-
pended FCC regulation, in final form, permits the requirement to be met, as
the Supreme Court noted, by "programming of others." According to the
Midwest Video opinion, the cable operator is not precluded "from cablecasting
programs produced by others" in satisfaction of the program origination re-
quirement. 406 U.S. at 653 n.6. 'In addition, since the "program origination"
channel is not formally one of the access channels described in the FCC regu-
lations, it is not at all certain that the regulations are meant to apply to it.
See Barnett, supra note 99, at 748.
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may simply intend the regulation to take effect but desire a delay
because of enforcement difficulties or policy disputes within the
agency; secondly, the suspension may indicate a belief on the part
of the agency that, for the present, no one should regulate the area
involved; finally, the agency may intend the suspension to indicate
that states and localities are free to regulate.
It should be realized that the third possibility is the least likely
interpretation of the suspension of the regulation. Furthermore,
suspension of a regulation should not be deemed equivalent to can-
cellation or withdrawal of the regulation. Therefore, no more state
regulation should be permitted over program origination as previously
required than would have been allowed if the regulation 'had not
been suspended.' 45
Another distinct component in the nonbroadcast channel regula-
tory scheme of the 1972 Rules is the provision for cable systems in
communities "located wholly outside of all major television mar-
kets.' 146 The final FCC regulations announce that no such system
"shall be required by a local entity to exceed the provisions concern-
ing the availability and administration of access channels contained
in paragraph (a) of this section.' 47 Such a formulation seems in-
tended to allow some state regulation of non-major-market cable
systems, within the limits of FCC regulation of access channels in
major markets; a state may regulate less than, or as much as, the
FCC has chosen to regulate, but no more. In addition, the FCC
regulations make it clear -that non-major-market systems are not re-
quired to make any access channels available, but that doing so will
subject them to several of the FCC access channel regulations. 148
The question from a preemption viewpoint is what "exceeding"
-the FCC provisions means. Can such state regulations as are prom-
145. An interesting question in this context is whether states could prohibit
program origination by the cable owner. Since alternative means of satisfying
the requirement, had it not been suspended, were provided in the requirement
itself, such a prohibition might not be found to conflict directly with the fed-
eral regulation, as long as the alternative means were not blocked. Under the
two-level intent model, the proper inquiry for a reviewing court would be
whether the FCC intended that the cable owner, rather than the state or local
authority, ought to have the ability to choose between the alternative means
of satisfying the program origination requirement. If it read the provision in
the context of the other access channel regulations, a court might well find
an intention to preserve the choice in the cable owner; but this result cannot
be predicted with certainty.
146. 47 C.F.R. § 76.251(b) (1973).
147. Id.
148. 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.251(a), (b) (1973).
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ulgated for non-major-market systems be different in nature from
-the FCC -regulations? Some guidance is available in the wording of
FCC regulations that are specifically made applicable to non-major-
market systems that choose to provide access channels. One such
regulation includes the proscription that "no local entity shall pre-
scribe any other rules concerning the number or manner of opera-
tion of access channels ..... 14 This evidences an intent on the
part of the FCC -that state regulation of non-major-market channels
be similar to, and no more involved than, the FCC regulation con-
templated for major-market access channels. Such an intent con-
templates a relatively small scope for any state "experimentation,"
which seems likely to be confined to minor variations on the FCC
regulatory theme, and provides the states with the obvious option of
not regulating at all.
The actual scheme of FCC regulation for access channels in
major-market cable systems is quite detailed, but not unclear. 150
Its general method is to divide nonbroadcast channels into various
categories, with separate sets of rules provided for each type of non-
broadcast channel. An enforcement mechanism is provided at the
outset: carriage of broadcast signals, the traditional and frequently
profitable activity of cable television systems, is made contingent upon
compliance with the rules for nonbroadcast channels.15' Further,
a minimum channel capacity for all cable systems of 20 channels is
required. 152
Another general requirement of the access channel regulations is
the "one-to-one" requirement. 53  This rule requires that for each
channel actually used 'by the cable system for retransmission of
'broadcast signals, one nonbroadcast signal channel be made avail-
able. In addition, each system is required to "maintain a plant
having technical capacity for nonvoice return communications."'1 54
While few cable systems today actually have any use for two-way
capacity, this requirement is seen as a hedge against future techno-
logical developments. 55
149. Id. § 76.251(a)(11)(iv).
150. Id. §§ 76.251(a), (c).
151. Id. § 76.251(a).
152. Id. § 76.251(a)(1). This requirement, on its face, poses another in-
teresting question of FCC intent: Can a state or local agency require more
than 20 channels? The preemptive effect of all these regulations is dis-
cussed in text accompanying notes 164-66 infra.
153. 47 C.F.R. § 76.251(a)(2) (1973).
154. Id. § 76.251(a)(3).
155. There is available today the technology to install two-way voice com-
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A number of specific channels are required by the rules for des-
ignated purposes. These include a "non-commercial public access
channel available on a first-come, nondiscriminatory basis," an "ed-
ucation access channel," a "local government access channel," and
a residual category designated "leased access channels."'156 The list-
hag of designated ehannels is followed by the "N + 1" rule, which
provides for expansion of the system in any of the designated cate-
gories when use of such channels becomes relatively intense.1 57 Op-
erators of cable systems are instructed to "exercise no control over
program content" on any of the designated categories of channels.1 58
In addition, such operators are prohibited from charging for the use
of the education and local government access channels for 5 years
after commencing service and from ever charging for the use of one
public access channel, except for studio production costs for pres-
entations exceeding 5 minutes. 159
A set of operating rules for the access channels is also provided.
These rules require system operators to "establish rules requiring
first-come nondiscriminatory access" and prohibit various sorts of
commercial uses for the public access channels. 60 Similar require-
ments are imposed on the educational access channels,' 6' whereas
the leased channels are freed from the restrictions on commercial
use.162 Finally, state and local regulatory authorities are notified:
"Except on specific authorization, or with respect to the operation of
the local government access channel, no local entity shall prescribe
any other rules concerning the number or manner of operation of
access channels."'-6 3
munication capacity in cable television systems. However, such capacity
would far exceed in cost the benefits from it presently envisioned, especially
in view of the nearly universal two-way voice capacity already supplied by the
telephone system. A nonvoice return capacity, on the other hand, is easily
within the reach of relatively inexpensive modem technology. It provides the
opportunity for various consumer services that may soon develop, such as direct
polling of viewer preferences and the ability to order products being shown on
the television screen. At the same time, however, it raises the problem of the
grave potential for invasion of privacy inherent in two-way capacity systems,
especially the more sophisticated versions required for two-way voice capacity.
156. 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.251(a)(4)-(7) (1973).
157. Id. § 76.251(a)(8).
158. Id. § 76.251(a)(9).
159. Id. § 76.251(a)(10).
160. Id. § 76.251(a)(11)(i).
161. Id. § 76.251(a)(11)(ii).
162. Id. § 76.251(a)(11)(iii).
163. Id. § 76.251 (a) (11)(iv). It is clear that this rule was meant to ap-
ply to both state and local authorities. The Commission's purpose in promul-
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On its face, this last rule appears to be in the nature of a dec-
laration of preemption of regulation directed at the designated access
channels. One authority believes -this to be their intent: "The 'ac-
cess' provisions of the intended rules . . . do purport to preclude
action in the same area by state or local authorities."'16 4 Another
recent study of the 1972 Rules discusses the rationale behind this
apparent intent:
The Commission has decided that national regulation of
cablecasting is necessary to promote these goals. By pre-
empting local regulation of cablecasting the FCC has
placed "local origination" under national pressures and re-
straints, rather than permitting channel uses to be based
on the needs and interests of each locality.165
Under a preemption doctrine restricted to searching for the intent of
Congress or the shape of actual regulation, such an attempt to pre-
empt might appear confusing in its effect. However, under the two-
level intent test, it is apparent that actual regulation by an agency is
of preemptive importance only insofar as it is evidence of the agency's
intent to preempt the field. Thus, the existence of a clear statement
of agency intent, such as this declaration of preemption, should have
-the same preemptive effect as a more detailed set of agency regu-
lations that left less room for experimentation by the cable operator.
The intent of the FCC is unambiguous: the exclusion of state and
local regulation attempting to "prescribe any other rules concerning
the number or manner of operation of access channels."'166
There exist however other possible indicia of FCC intent, not
apparent from the face of the 1972 access channel rules, which
may prove relevant in evaluating the preemptive effect of those rules
on state and local regulation of cable television. For example, there
is some evidence that the 1972 Rules, particularly the one-to-one
gating § 76.251(a)(11)(iv) is explained in 131 of the Cable Television
Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 193 (1972). "There remains the
issue of whether also to permit state or local regulation of these channels
where not inconsistent with federal purposes. We think that in this area a
dual form of regulation would be confusing and impracticable. Our objective
of allowing a period of experimentation might be jeopardized if, for example,
a local entity were to specify more restrictive regulations than we have pre-
scribed. Thus, except for the government channel, local regulation of access
channels is precluded. If experience and further proceedings indicate its need
or desirability, we can then delineate an appropriate local role." Obviously,
a "dual form of regulation" will occur if either state or local authorities attempt
to regulate access channels.
164. Barnett, supra note 99, at 737.
165. Note, supra note 100, at 819.
166. See note 163 supra.
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rule, are not being fully enforced.167 Does such nonenforcement go
to the strength of the FCC's intent to preempt? Or does it suggest
doubts about the reality of such intent, or perhaps a change in that
intent since the promulgation of the 1972 Rules? Or does nonen-
forcement indicate the existence of a situation where inadequate
manpower has prevented the FCC from actively policing all of its
requirements? It is clear, in any event, that nonenforcement does
not create an "interval" situation. Since the responsible agency has
issued regulations, there is nothing to wait for.'6 8
If, however, the analysis of the "formally suspended" regulation
requiring program origination is accepted' 6 9 -then nonenforcement
cannot be regarded as having any effect on preemption. Such a con-
clusion follows a fortiori from the realization that something equiva-
lent to formal repudiation is required to contravene the presumption
of agency intent established by the promulgation of regulations.
Even though -there may be indications that the agency is. reconsider-
ing its initial regulations, there still remains the very real possibility
that it may still intend to exclude state and local regulation, even in
the absence of its own presence. This is precisely the case with the
declaration of preemption regarding additional operating rules for
the access channels.
One enlightening indication of FCC intent is the Final Report
of the FCC Cable Television Advisory Committee on Federal/State-
Local Regulatory Relationships (Advisory Committee Report).'7 0
Although the recommendations of the Committee are not binding on
the FCC, they do expose a cross section of opinion on the proper
contours of cable television regulation. The Advisory Committee
Report, written largely by representatives of the cable industry,
"endorses the FCC in its present rules providing for a period of ex-
perimentation regarding channel access under solely Federal guide-
lines.' 71 In fact, the Advisory Committee Report recommends to-
167. Memorandum from Paul Berman, Feb. 1, 1974, at 3.
168. See notes 54-56 supra and accompanying text.
169. See notes 144-45 supra and accompanying text.
170. FCC CABLE TELEVISION ADVISORY COMMIrrEE ON FPEDERAL/STATE-
LOCAL REGULA.TORY RELATIONSHmPS, FINAL REPORT (1973) [hereinafter cited
as ADVISORY COMMnTE REPORT]. It is important to distinguish this Report
from the Report of the Office of Telecommunications, the Whitehead Report.
The Whitehead Report recommended a national policy of creating common
carrier status for cable systems owners; neither report has been acted upon
by either the Congress or the Commission. The common carrier approach is
generally feared by the cable industry, which believes that such status would
limit future profits from cablecasting.
171. ADVISORY CoMMrrrE REPORT 23.
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tal preemption by the FCC of all facets of cable television regula-
tion, with the notable exception of franchising. The cable industry,
as represented in the Advisory Committee Report, seems to fear
state regulation, preferring the approach taken in the FCC 1972
Rules, which place control of access channels in the hands of the
cable owner. Such an expression of opinion is useful for preemption
purposes, however, only to the extent that as it actually influences
the behavior of -the Commission, a consideration that remains in-
determinate.
A final source of additional insight into the FCC's intent is the
body of Teported decisions by the FCC on matters related to cable
regulation. Two recent decisions by the Commission are of special
interest in determining the FCC's intended scope of its 1972 Rules.
The first of -these is Riverside Cable Corp.,172 which dealt with sec-
tion 76.11(a) of the Commission's rules on cable television, which
provides that "[n]o cable system shall commence operations or add
a television broadcast signal to existing operations unless it receives
a certificate of compliance from the Commission.' 1 73 In Riverside
a new cable operator had begun construction of his system without
obtaining such a certificate and a competing system sought an order
to halt construction on that ground. In holding that a certificate was
not required until the new system attempted to begin actual oper-
ations, the Commission observed that 'the rules adopted in . . .
Cable Television Report and Order. . . are geared to become oper-
ative only with the carriage of broadcast signals .... ,,174 Although
this language does not necessarily speak to the FCC's power -to re-
quire a certificate before the carriage of broadcast signals, it is cer-
tainly a relevant administrative interpretation of the FCC's rules.
It should be noted that the Riverside case dealt with a single oper-
ator not yet under FCC control in any respect. Another pertinent
FCC decision is Sterling Manhattan Cable Television, Inc. v. New
York Telephone Co.' 75  There, the telephone company had begun
to distribute movies to hotels through its own cable systems, which
were entirely intrastate; no retransmission of broadcast signals was
engaged in or contemplated. Under such circumstances, the FCC
decided not to demand certification for these cable operations under
the 1972 Rules, stressing both the entirely intrastate character of
172. 42 F.C.C.2d 783 (1973).
173. 47 C.F.R. § 46.11(a) (1973).
174. 42 F.C.C.2d at 783.
175. 38 F.C.C.2d 1149 (1973).
[Vol. 25:258
PREEMPTION OF CATV REGULATION
the operation, and the absence of any carriage of broadcast signals.
Taken together, do Riverside and Sterling hold that the FCC
could not restructure its regulatory system to reach a cable operator
with no broadcast channels? No clear answer to this question is
apparent, but at a minimum, these decisions demonstrate an FCC
intent not to engage in such regulation at this time. Under the ex-
isting structure of FCC regulation of nonbroadcast aspects of cable
television, a cable operator who chooses not to retransmit broadcast
signals would probably lie outside the scope of FCC regulation and
would consequently not be protected from state or local regulation
by the blanket of federal preemption. 176
C. Consequences for State Regulation
The FCC has specifically reserved several aspects of regulation
of cable television operations for state and local authorities.1 77 Most
prominent is the franchising process, the procedures for which may
be prescribed by a state or local regulatory authority.' 78 As Pro-
fessor Barnett points out the FCC has not incorporated any sug-
gested procedures for franchising into its rules. Consequently, "it
seems essential that the state regulatory scheme embody such re-
quirements."' 1 9 Thus, it is clear that, far from being preempted,
state franchising. procedures are explicitly permitted by the FCC's
intentions as expressed in the 1972 Rules.' 80
176. One rationale implicitly accepted by the Supreme Court in Midwest
Video could provide a basis for FCC regulation of cable operators with no
broadcast channels. See United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649,
662 n.21 (1972), and Barnett, supra note 99, at 727. While the potential for
a nonbroadcast cable network, linking together the programming of cable oper-
ators across the nation without using broadcast television signals, is not covered
by the 1972 Rules, it is almost certainly within the scope of the agency's reg-
ulatory power. But since the FCC's present intention to preempt or not is of
primary significance under the two-level intent test, such activities should not
be held to be preempted under the 1972 Rules.
177. See notes 134-37 supra and accompanying text.
178. 47 C.F.R. § 76.31 (1973); see also Barnett, supra note 99, at 737.
179. Barnett, supra note 99, at 779.
180. In the original Letter of Intent issued by the FCC, the Commission
expressed an intention to require state or local regulation in those areas finally
reserved for state or local action in the actual 1972 Rules. Had the initial
approach been retained, interesting questions would have been raised about the
impact on federalism of such requirements. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301
U.S. 548 (1936), indicates that a statute that called "for a surrender by the
states of powers essential to their quasi-sovereign existence" would be declared
invalid, id. at 593, and such an argument might well be made against a require-
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Other segments of the cable television industry are also left open
to state and local regulation. The FCC Rules establish a 15-year
"guideline for duration of cable franchises" which is declared to -be
a "requirement of 'reasonableness that may vary with the particular
circumstances.' "Is Therefore, the duration of cable franchises is
left at least partially to state or local authorities. Another aspect of
cable systems specifically left to local authorities is "supervising the
service rendered by the cable system and regulating the rates."'18 2
However, one topic apparently left unsettled by the FCC 1972
Rules is the regulation of transfers of control of cable systems.
Ownership of cable television systems by parties already involved in
ownership of -related media is an area of some confusion under the
existing FCC Rules. The Commission has adopted a rule "prohib-
iting cross-ownership between the cable system and the television
station."' 83 Nevertheless, the question whether to prohibit ownership
of cable systems by owners of local newspapers has not yet been re-
solved. Professor Barnett explains why such a cross-ownership re-
striction might be desirable: "Owners-hip of the cable system by the
newspaper whose monopoly it challenges 'would seem unlikely to
promote development of the system in . . . respects that are so crit-
ical to the public interest in cable.' 18 4
The question arises, then, whether a state is preempted from
establishing a newspaper-cable television cross-ownership restriction
by the FCC's inaction on the subject to date. What type of FCC
intent would be relevant to a finding of preemption here? Would
the mere failure to adopt such a restriction on a national basis suffice
to preempt state regulation, or would an explicit prohibition of cross-
ownership restrictions beyond those established by -the FCC be re-
quired?
It is useful in this regard to consider newspaper cross-ownership
restrictions as falling into the "interval" category of preemption prob-
lems.' 8 5 In an interval situation, where the -agency's intentions are
ment that a state or subdivision of a state initiate a program of regulation.
Under the permissive approach finally chosen, however, no such problems seem
present.
181. 47 C.F.R. § 76.31(a)(3) (1973); see also Barnett, supra note 99, at
781.
182. 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.31(a)(4), (5) (1973); see also Bamett, supra note
99, at 752.
183. 47 C.F.R. § 76.501(a)(2) (1973); see also Barnett, supra note 99, at
795.
184. Barnett, supra note 99, at 797 (footnote omitted).
185. That the FCC may be considering adopting such a rule would be the
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ambiguous, it is relevant to determine whether the area sought to be
regulated by the state is separable from other regulated areas.' 8 6
In addition, such an ambiguous situation indicates a need for bal-
ancing the supposed need for national uniformity with whatever
state or local interest is asserted. 87
Under the interval-situation analysis it is unlikely -that a court
would find that a state has been preempted from establishing its
own newspaper cross-ownership restriction-at least until the FCC
resolves its own inquiry into this area. The economic implications
of cross-ownership alone should be sufficient to grant states tem-
porary regulatory power over this area in -the absence of FCC action.
In addition, states would logically bear the burden of ensuring that
their citizenry did not hear the same owner's viewpoint expressed
in all the available media. Thrown into the balance, these factors
speak strongly for permitting state regulation of cross-ownership in
the present interval situation. An alternate route, however, has been
indicated for reaching this same result which effectively by-passes
preemption considerations. This argument runs as follows:
While an FCC decision not to adopt the newspaper-cable
rule would be ill-advised, no reason appears why it should
preclude the adoption of such a rule or policy on the part
of state or local entities, as N.Y.C. and Massachusetts have
done. If the FCC is not going to "set out comparative
criteria to govern the selection process," but is going to
leave that choice to the state or local government, it should
not attempt to prohibit their use of this one particular com-
parative criterion, a consideration that has peculiar local
impact and is not contrary to any significant federal policy
on which the FCC's negative decision could be based.'88
It is important to note that such an argument carries any weight
only for so long as the FCC does not prohibit state cross-ownership
restrictions and does not promulgate a new rule setting out "com-
parative criteria" in the franchising selection process.
A further issue of general applicability and significant ambiguity
is that of franchise fees payable to municipalities by cable systems.
The FCC 1972 Rules establish a maximum of 3 to 5 percent of
gross revenues for such charges, with a showing of "reasonableness"
only complicating factor in such an approach. See Notice of Proposed Rule
Making and of Inquiry, June 24, 1970, 23 F.C.C.2d 833 (1970); Barnett,
supra note 99, at 795-96.
186. See notes 54-61 supra and accompanying text.
187. See notes 19, 20 supra and accompanying text.
188. Barnett, supra note 99, at 803 (footnote omitted).
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required for charges exceeding 3 percent.'8 9  What, however,
would be the effect of a state's setting a flat fee per subscriber to be
paid by the cable owner to both the state and the franchising mu-
nicipality? One of the considerations behind such a flat fee is the
prevention of deals between cable owners and municipalities, which
freeze out smaller operators by "auctioning off" franchises to the
highest bidder. 190 The question that remains unanswered is whether
the FCC's limit would supersede the normally lower rate of the state
fee.' 9 ' A solution is to submerge -the 'problem in the franchising
process, 'making the franchise fee one of the factors considered by
the state authority in "deciding in the first instance whether to en-
dorse applications to the FCC."' 92 Assuming that a state's flat fee
lies within the bounds of the FCC rule, since the 'FCC has not at-
tempted to set actual rates itself, there should be no finding of con-
flict between the two authorities, absent some new expression of
FCC intent to the contrary. The FCC has no apparent interest in
letting fees be determined 'by municipalities, rather than 'the state.
A final aspect of state cable regulation posing potential pre-
emption problems stems from the desire, on the part of some states,
to grant CATV common carrier status. 93 To accomplish this goal
a state may attempt to separate ownership of cable systems from
ownership of programming.19 4
It would appear, however, that any such separation by a state is
189. 47 C.F.R. § 76.31(b) (1973); see also Barnett, supra note 99, at 804.
190. Massachusetts Community Antenna Television Commission Proceed-
ings, Nov. 2, 1973.
191. The Supreme Court recently decided the case of National Cable Tele-
vision Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 94 S. Ct. 1146 (1974), which dealt with
a different aspect of FCC fees. Acting under 31 U.S.C. § 483(a) (1970),
the FCC had set a schedule of fees to cable system owners to cover the cost
of FCC regulation. Since the Court, per Justice Douglas, held that part of the
value of regulation redounds to the benefit of the public, it remanded the pro-
ceeding to the Commission for redetermination of the fees. This action has
no effect on the franchise fee limitations set by the FCC in its 1972 Rules.
192. Barnett, supra note 99, at 805.
193. See notes 101-05 supra and accompanying text.
194. See note 144 supra. Indeed, such an attempt has recently been made
in the Massachusetts Community Antenna Television Commission Proposed
Draft Regulations (Mar. 20, 1974), where the Commission seeks to distinguish
"licensee" and "cableserver." As proposed, "the licensee shall be responsible
for the technological performance of the cable system," id. § 4.0, while
"[e]ach cableserver shall be responsible for the non-technological performance
of his channel." Id. § 4.1(A). It should be further noted that the Proposed
Draft Regulations provide that the cableserver alone shall be liable in any
action brought under federal or state law based on the content of programming.
Id. § 4.1(B).
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precluded by considerations of federal preemption. In directing its
attention to such a separation of ownership provision contained in
regulations proposed in Massachusetts, the majority in the Advisory
Committee Report noted that "[i]n the majority's judgment, such
action directly contravenes 47 C.F.R. 76.201 and earlier Commission
determination that common carrier status for CATV would be in-
appropriate."' 195 Even the minority, more friendly to state regula-
tion, observed that "[t]hese policies have not yet been embodied or
even proposed for embodiment in concrete regulations, and any that
are will obviously have to dovetail with existing FCC regulation
. . , "196 Of course, these comments are not conclusive but the Ad-
visory Committee Report does offer a rationale for its opposition to
the Massachusetts policy:
In practical effect, this means that CATV cannot prepare
for, or finance, program originations in Massachusetts with-
out contemplating extensive legal defense costs to contest
state law, and long delays during which CATV will violate
the spirit and perhaps the letter of applicable federal law.
Whatever CATV does in Massachusetts, it loses.' 97
A similar conclusion has been reached by one author:
Since the FCC's order would manifestly conflict with state
and local regulation aimed at achieving carrier status,
mandatory origination preempts critical areas of cable serv-
ice from state control and forecloses the prospect that state
regulation might effectively classify cable systems as car-
riers.' 98
There are several possible responses to these arguments, one based
on the assertion that the proposed Massachusetts regulations are not
actually in conflict with the FCC 1972 Rules, others relying on some
"affirmative" consideration to validate the Massachusetts approach
despite conflict with the FCC Rules. All, however, are founded upon
misunderstandings of the fundamental nature of the preemption doc-
trine as applied to administrative agencies.
The affirmative responses admit the conflict between state and
FCC regulatory approaches, but seek to uphold the state regulation
nonetheless. These can be dealt with briefly. Professor Barnett
suggests that conflict with the actual language of the FCC rules
might not necessarily trigger a finding of federal preemption, since
195. ADVISORY COMMITrEB REPORT 40.
196. Id. at 88 (Minority Report).
197. ADVISORY COMMITEE REPORT 40.
198. Rivkin, The Changing Signals of Cable TV, 60 GEo. L.J 1475, 1493
(1972) (footnotes omitted).
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Massachusetts-type regulation "would be designed to multiply and
enhance the non-broadcast uses of the system, and would thus be
'not inconsistent with federal purposes.' "199 Nevertheless, such con-
siderations are relevant only in the absence of a clear expression of
federal intent; examinations of what purposes supposedly lie be-
hind federal regulations are useful only in construing ambiguous
language, not in by-passing clear expressions of regulatory intent.
If actual conflict between the FCC and Massachusetts Community
Antenna Television Commission regulatory approaches does exist,
then examinations of underlying federal purposes will not save the
state regulation from preemption. It is up to the federal agency in
the formulation of its regulations to determine whether it intends to
allow state variations not inconsistent -with its purposes.
A second affirmative response is to justify variation from the
federally mandated regulatory pattern through a rationale of "ex-
perimentation." Its proponents assert that such a response gains
particular force20o from the FCC's pronouncement that its own rules
are meant to be experimental; in this view, the Massachusetts variant
is but another experiment in the larger federal pattern. United
Telegraph Workers v. Federal Communications Commission20 1 (the
Mailgram case) could be interpreted as supporting such a conclu-
sion. In that case a cooperative effort between Western Union and
the Postal Service that arguably violated statutory restrictions was
approved, partly on the grounds that this involved an experiment
that did not contravene the purpose of the statute. The argument
in support of experimentation, however, ignores the considerations
of the intent model in agency preemption. It is one thing to con-
strue an ambiguous statute to allow a federal agency to conduct an
experiment unforeseeable at the time -the statute was passed; it is
quite another to disregard a clear pronouncement of agency intent
to deny cable owners common carrier status. 202  The experimenta-
tion argument apparently would have a reviewing court ask whether
the FCC should sanction other experimental approaches to regula-
tion of cable beyond its own. The relevant inquiry, however, is
whether the FCC actually intends to allow regulatory approaches of
the sort being advanced as experimental.
199. Barnett, supra note 99, at 790 n.601.
200. Memorandum from Paul Berman, Feb. 1, 1974, at 4.
201. 436 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
202. Further, the Mailgram case was not one dealing with a conflict be-
tween federal and state power, but rather with the restrictions placed upon a
federal agency by a federal statute.
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Thus, the critical fact to be dealt with in responding to a pre-
emption claim is the FCC's own declaration of preemption:
Except on specific authorization, or -with respect -to -the
operation of the local government access channel, no local
entity shall prescribe any other rules concerning the num-
ber or manner of operation of access channels.203
It is not necessarily the content of regulations like those proposed
in Massachusetts that conflicts with the FCC's expressed intentions,
but rather their very existence. Assuming that Massachusetts is a
"local entity" within the meaning of the FCC Rules,20 4 any attempt,
by that or any other state, -to prescribe the "manner of operation of
access channels" would appear to conflict with the FCC Rules and
therefore be preempted.
More particularly, the General Lease and Utilization Require-
ments2 0 5 of the proposed Massachusetts Community Antenna Tele-
vision Commission regulations, which establish the separation of the
cable owner from the provision of programming and services over
the cable, seem to be attempts to regulate the manner of operation of
the nonbroadcast channels to which they apply. Although one should
not infer a condemnation by the FCC rules of the separation policy,
the preemptive impact of the declaration of preemption is to bar all
state regulation of cable activity that relates to the operation of ac-
cess channels. Under the FCC Rules, such decisions are to be left
to the cable owner . 2 0  The intention of the FCC to preempt state
regulation in this area is clearly subject to change, and some spe-
cific expression of such a change, under the two-level intent model,
should suffice to bar a -finding of preemption. However, absent such
a decision by the FCC, any reviewing court should find a regulation
that separates ownership of cable systems from control over program-
ming to be invalid.
IV. CONCLUSION
The two-level intent model for preemption by federal administra-
tive agencies provides a means for resolving the occasionally novel
questions raised by the FCC's unusual regulatory approach to non-
broadcast channels in cable television systems. Those few am-
biguities that still remain are, on the whole, implicit in the language
203. 47 C.F.R. § 76.251(a)(11)(iv) (1973); see note 163 supra.
204. See note 163 supra.
205. Massachusetts Community Antenna Television Commission Proposed
Draft Regulations § 1 (Mar. 20, 1974).
206. 47 C.F.R. § 76.251(a)(11)(i) (1973).
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of the 1972 Rules themselves. However, as the FCC becomes more
certain of the approaches it intends to take toward cable television,
it should become less complicated for states to determine their pro-
per role in the regulatory structure. Of course, there always remains
the possibility of specific congressional legislation on cable, which
could make the plans and intentions of the FCC irrelevant. Until
such legislation is passed, the two-level intent model appears to be
the most useful analytical tool in the area of cable television regu-
lation.
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